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The Ideologies of Taxation. By Louis EISENSTaN. New York: The Ronald
Press Co., 1961. Pp. vii, 263. $5.00.
Federal Tax Reform: The Issues and a Program. By DAN THROOP SMITH. New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961. Pp. viii, 328. $7.00.
I
Louis Eisenstein's book, The Ideologies of Taxation, is a devastating attack
upon "the modes of thought to which groups and interests resort in order to
obtain tax laws to their liking.", It reprimands the use of phrases lacking
meaningful content, arguments inconsistent with the facts, and sloppy thinking in general. The author demonstrates effectively that folklore and myths
play a disturbingly dominant role in shaping tax policy. I daresay that virtually every reader who has ever discussed or considered tax-policy problems will
find at least one of his own pet theories thoroughly "debunked." This, of
course, is a rather unsettling experience-but for those not addicted to corrplacency, an extremely stimulating and worthwhile experience. This is so not
only because there is an important lesson to be learned but also because, in
this instance, the lesson is stated with brilliance of language and analysis and
with an abundance of tongue-in-cheek wit.
The book begins on a note of cynical realism. The reader is reminded of the
fairly obvious, but too frequently ignored fact that the tax system is the
product of the political accommodation of pressures resulting primarily from
self-interest. "Our taxes reflect a continuing struggle among contending interests for the privilege of paying the least." 2 But one of the central themes of the
book is that naked self-interest has not been regarded as an acceptable basis
for demanding the adoption of a given tax provision or system. Instead reliance
has been placed on arguments whose sole virtue is that they bestow upon their
proponents an appearance of selflessness, neutrality, and dedication to the
"public interest." Eisenstein divides such arguments into three categories,
the three "ideologies" of taxation: ability to pay, barriers and deterrents,
and equity.
The author first directs his attention to the ideology of ability to pay. He
traces the origin of this concept, as used in the development of this country's
tax system, to the arguments over the adoption of a progressive income tax.
He expresses approval of the candor which characterized the early debate on
this issue: the class discrimination which this form of taxation imposed was
either deplored or praised, but it was not denied. Later the proponents of the
tax became more "discreet" and began to rely on the ability concept. Thereafter they "firmly assume[d] that this concept provides a principle of taxation
which is happily unmarred by selfish interest or bias."3 Their reasoning was
that since increments to higher incomes were of less utility than increments to
lower incomes, progressivity in the income tax was required in order to
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achieve "equality," "justice," and "neutrality." But, Eisenstein observes,
even if the somewhat questionable premise is conceded, the conclusion simply
does not follow; whatever may be the justification for progressivity, it cannot
be said that progressivity leads to "equality and neutrality" unless we "indulge in a strange use of English." 4 At the same time he takes issue with the
concern of Professors Blum and Kalven that the marginal utility of income
to the recipient cannot be measured.5 In his view this is irrelevant; regardless
of the psychic value to the recipient, a social evaluation can and should be
made. To the Blum and Kalven rejoinder that society should not make this
kind of evaluation, his response is simply that as long as we have taxes a
choice between various kinds of tax must be made; any tax therefore reflects
such a social evaluation. One need not take sides in this debate in order to
appreciate the basic point that a progressive tax can be justified, if at all, only
as a measure designed to mitigate disparities in wealth. 6 Eisenstein's dissatisfaction with the ability to pay doctrine stems from the doctrine's rejection of
this point.
On a somewhat less academic level, Eisenstein points out that the ability
ideology offers no answer to the question of how progressive the rates should
be. This, of course, is the really important issue. He then proceeds to discluss
certain current applications of the ideology and the significant departures
from it. The departures are used to demonstrate the lack of utility of the doctrine; any departure must be assessed on the basis of social and economic
policy considerations which have nothing to do with ability to pay. In short,
he concludes, "to speak forcefully of ability to pay is merely to indulge in
evasive rhetoric." 7
Eisenstein next considers the "gloomy" ideology of barriers and deterrents,
which "dwells on the alarming theme that the economy is deteriorating because the rates are too high."8 The predominance of this theme in current

tax-policy discussion results in a wealth of material which is peculiarly vulnerable to Eisenstein's kind of attack. The first step in his technique is to devote
considerable space to quoting and summarizing the positions taken by the
adherents of the ideology; thus he forecloses any argument that he is attacking a "straw man." Next he simply states the facts. The ideology falls of its
own weight, assisted, however, by the author's subtle, biting, witty sarcasm.
For example, he cites all the dire predictions, past and current, as to the wrack
and ruin which can be expected to result from high individual rates. Among
these are statements made by Secretary Mellon in the early twenties. He points
out that "through the heroic efforts of Mellon the ideology of barriers and
4P.
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5 BLUM & KALVEN, THE UNEAsY CASE FOR PROGnssiv TAXATIoN 64 (1952).

6 It should be noted that a progressive tax is not essential for the purpose of raising
revenue. Professor Smith amply demonstrates this point at page 17 of his book, Federal Tax
Reform, which is reviewed herein.
7 P. 56.
8 P. 59.
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deterrents enjoy a Golden Age of about seven years. Between 1925 and 1932
the highest rate of income tax was 25 per cent." 9 He proceeds to describe in
detail, in the language of the ideology, the advantages which the adherents
assumed would follow from this situation. Thus the victim is fattened for the
kill, which begins with the following statement:
Now if facts were relevant, the ideology of barriers and deterrents
would soon disappear. Very low rates were followed by unparalleled disaster. Very high rates have been accompanied by unprecedented growth.
... But since the facts are irrelevant, the ideologists of barriers and deterrents courageously carry on with the same words and phrases.10
Of course, Eisenstein is too good a lawyer to rest his case on this dramatic but
somewhat inconclusive opening argument. He proceeds to discuss the mass of
empirical data and experience which indicates that, in spite of the current high
rates, executives are working as hard as ever. He then goes on to raise a
"more subversive question":11 are we really committed to the notion that
encouragement of non-business efforts, or even leisure, is an evil to be avoided
at all costs?
Various other forms of the ideology of barriers and deterrents are attacked
with equal vigor. Thus, in addition to the "dogma of declining effort,"1 2 he
discusses the "dogma of diminishing risk"13 and the "dogma of inadequate
savings." 14 His attacks on these are clever, incisive, and well documented. It
is true that the facts available do not rule out all possibility of adverse economic effects. But the facts are, when used by a writer of Eisenstein's skill,
sufficient to make the typically extreme positions taken by the barriers and
deterrents ideologists look untenable if not ridiculous.
Are the proponents of lower individual rates left without any argument
then? Not necessarily. Eisenstein suggests, somewhat fleetingly, that they
"might argue that when a rate passes beyond a certain point, it becomes unethical and hence unworthy of enactment." 15 This is presumably a counterpart to the suggestion to the ability ideologists that they candidly support
progressivity on grounds of social policy. Eisenstein does not appear to hold
any illusion that the suggestion will be adopted by either group; in this era an
appearance of selflessness is thought to be absolutely essential.
After devoting separate chapters to capital gains and depletion, he discusses the third ideology in a chapter entitled "The Wondrous Ways of
Equity." His general point is that the term "equity," together with its various
synonyms is, and for the sake of serving its purpose must be, essentially
meaningless. "An ideology must speak in majestic tones, but it should shun
any effort to be too instructive. Its power to persuade hinges largely on its
failure to enlighten."1 6 The essential tenet of the ideology of equity, according to Eisenstein, is that equal incomes should be equally taxed. One difficulty
9 P. 65.
10Ibid.
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with this notion, he says, is that it fails to enlighten us on the really difficult
issues, such as: should the recipients of equal amounts of capital gain, dividends, and salary be regarded as having equal incomes? As another example,
the ideology does not tell us whether an income tax is more "equitable" than
a sales tax.
Getting more specific, he cites instances in which "equity" has been used to
justify individually tailored statutes. One of his leading examples is the statute
enacted to tax at a rate of 25 per cent, rather than 91 per cent, compensation
paid to Louis B. Mayer on retirement. Of course the "bunching" problem
may be thought to have justified the provision. Eisenstein's point is that
special provisions can be justified if they are enacted in response to special
circumstances but should not be enacted solely in response to the influence of
a particular individual.
Of even greater significance, I think, is Eisenstein's attack on what I would
refer to as the "me too" psychology of the tax-policy thinking of our day.
This appallingly prevalent attitude accounts for a substantial proportion of
the "tax-relief" provisions which have been subject to widest criticism. The
notion is that if one group of taxpayers is enjoying a given tax benefit, then
other similarly situated groups should be equally entitled to it. A good example of Eisenstein's skill as a writer is the following passage in which he describes and at the same time shatters this kind of selfish, narrow-minded
thinking:
When a dispensation is desired in the name of equity, the request need not
be justified on the basis of alleged merit. It is enough that the dispensation
is already enjoyed by someone else who can be considered similarly situated.
Nor is it material-that the dispensation was originally granted for some
unrelated purpose. Equity is not concerned with such details. The sole question is whether those who are aggrieved have the required resemblance. 17
The final chapters of the book are devoted, at least nominally, to demonstrating the uselessness of the terms "loophole" and "public interest." In the
course of this demonstration the author is able to make some provocative
miscellaneous observations. For example, he indicates his very pessimistic
attitude toward the prospect of disinterested tax-reform leadership from the
tax bar at large or the ABA Section on Taxation in particular. In addition, he
takes issue with the notion that "special dispensations" (his supposedly neutral
substitute for the term "loophole") are a result of high rates and that the pressure for such dispensations will tend to disappear if the rates are lowered. To
this he reacts with skepticism, stating that, while such "talk is very contagious," 18 the fact is that, for the group primarily interested in lower rates, any
rate "will always be too high" because "in their considered view income
taxes are inherently evil."1 9 in any event, lowering the top rate to 65 per cent,
17 p. 173.
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as some of the ability adherents are willing to do, certainly will not reduce the
wealthy taxpayer's feeling of persecution and clamor "for relief." This is
certainly an interesting speculation which appears to have at least as much
foundation in experience as the position which it attacks. Unfortunately, we
have little basis other than pure speculation for choosing between the two
views.
II
The ideas presented in The Ideologies of Taxation offer an interesting and
useful framework for analysis of Dan Throop Smith's Federal Tax Reform.
But standing alone such an analysis would be somewhat unfair in light of the
avowed purpose and scope of Smith's book. FederalTax Reform does not purport to be thorough, scholarly, or rigorous; nor could it be without defeating
its purpose. That purpose is to present to the general reader, in a palatable
dish, virtually all the current issues of tax policy, as well as the author's suggestions for reforms which he regards as politically possible. The purpose is
well served. Even the more difficult issues are presented in an interesting and
comprehensible manner. The book is generally quite readable (considering
its subject-matter), though there are passages which bear the signs, both in
language and reasoning, of a rush job. Smith's discussion is far more informative and much less affected by bias than most statements on tax issues addressed to the general public. Moreover, most of his suggestions for reform
are quite sensible and sound; they are suggestions on which there would be
widespread agreement by objective experts. The author has performed a very
worthwhile service in presenting to the public the arguments in favor of such
a broad array of desirable proposals. This being so, it may seem a disservice
to the cause of tax reform to take issue with the more controversial general
premises on which he relies. But to the extent that these premises are used to
justify questionable proposals they cannot be ignored.
Smith is a man of very strong opinions and biases. These are by no means
concealed, but, coming from the pen of an expert, there is a distinct danger
that they may be regarded by the non-expert as unchallengeable. This is
especially so with respect to the more complex, technical, and difficult issues,
such as the depreciation deduction. Nor is the reader given a fair presentation
of both sides of the argument on many issues which are the subject of serious
objective controversy. It is true that Smith is scrupulous to mention views
inconsistent with his, but in most instances this merely amounts to paying lip
service to impartiality. Thus, he may enter a note of caution as to the lack of
theoretical agreement or empirical support for assertions as to the effect of a
given tax upon economic activity. But the assuredness with which he finally
makes such assertions seems to overwhelm the note of caution.
Smith's central theme is that upper-bracket individual tax rates are too
high. In reaching this conclusion he purports to rely in large part on what
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Eisenstein calls the ideology of barriers and deterrents. Thus, says Smith, the
individual rates are too high b~cause (among other reasons) they reduce
economic incentive and thereby reduce individual effort. He does not question

the proposition that any tax which discourages individual business effort is
ipso facto pernicious. But assuming that one is willing to accept this proposition, major difficulties remain. Smith concedes that high tax rates may actually
result in increased efforts by persons who wish to reach or maintain a standard
of living which they regard as minimum. He also concedes the significance of
non-pecuniary motives for business effort. Yet he concludes, without pretense
of empirical support, that on the balance individual efforts will be decreased
in a significant amount by the high rates. Those like myself who are not prepared to join with him in this "leap of faith" may tend to lose confidence in
his judgment on other matters. This reaction is intensified by the manner in
which his conclusion as to the relationship between taxes and individual effort
is used throughout the book: he suggests that, because of the presumed relationship, not only must the upper bracket rates be lowered, but other reforms
should be considered dependent upon or subordinate to the achievement of
this objective.
At times, however, Smith justifies his opposition to high rates in more emotional terms. Thus, at one point he states that "our present virtually confiscatory individual tax rates" are largely the result of the New Deal's "punitive
attitude toward wealth." 20 This kind of existentialist approach to taxation
may be honest and therapeutic, but it seems more likely to result in a hardening of adverse positions than in a meeting of the minds. Moreover, if the desired rate of progressivity is to be determined on this kind of "guts reaction"
basis, then I should think that the chances for a reduction in the present high
rates are rather remote. But perhaps Eisenstein is correct in his view that the
21
issue cannot properly be argued in any other terms.
As indicated before, however, the central theme is the ideology of barriers
and deterrents. Implicit in that ideology is the assumption that the principal
goal of tax policy is the promotion of economic growth. For Smith, economic
growth seems to be not just a goal but an obsession. At the same time, his
approach is eclectic. He also relies on the goals of "fairness" (which, of course,
is synonymous with "equity") and "simplicity" (which is equally unenlightening). For reasons similar to Eisenstein's, he regards ability to pay as "little
more than a phrase." 22 Instead, he leans toward the countervailing theory,
which is taxation in accordance with benefit-a somewhat Draconian and
now rather unfashionable viewpoint. For example, in discussing personal
exemptions, he states:
Even if government services could be financed by taxes imposed solely
on the rich, action to do so would be an unintended application of the

supposedly repugnant slogan of "from each according to his ability; to
20 P. 35.

21 See pp. 423, 427 supra.

22 P. 13.
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each according to his need." Any denial of universal responsibility for
the support of government [is
untenable].... Essential government services
are an integral part of everyone's standard of living ....23

On specific issues, the availability of good concrete arguments usually
makes it unnecessary to rely on controversial abstract theories. Thus, without
regard to such theories, Smith is able to present forceful arguments for such
proposals as denial of capital-gains treatment to lump-sum withdrawals from
pension plans, taxation of interest on state and local bonds issued in the future,
and gradual elimination of percentage depletion. As to other matters-such
as the business expense account and the deduction of interest on home mortgages-he effectively presents the current problem and indicates the difficulty
of achieving an entirely satisfactory solution; the solutions which he does suggest are reasonable and practical compromises, even though they do not go
as far as others might like. At the same time, he does not hesitate to suggest
drastic changes where they seem appropriate and politically feasible. For e%ample, he sees no reason why mergers which are in effect equivalent to sales
should not bring about the same tax consequences as sales. Accordingly, he
suggests that "the definition of tax-free reorganizations could be tightened to
limit it to exchanges involving recapitalizations of a single company or a
single predecessor and a single successor corporation." 24 To the tax specialist
who might regard the suggestion as too drastic he points out that "the present
broad definition is a surprise to nonexperts when they first learn of it as well
as to tax specialists in other countries." 25 However, he sees no need for the
change at this time. Another interesting suggestion for far-reaching change is
his proposal for eliminating the tax advantages of the use of trusts. Unfortunately, this proposal is stated with a disturbing lack of clarity and detail. His
basic idea is that the grantor of a trust should be taxed on its income unless he
has made a complete and final transfer to another single individual; in addition he seems to suggest that the beneficiary of a trust should be taxable on
its income regardless of whether that income is distributed. While the idea
does not seem to have been worked out too well, it does seem worthy of serious consideration.
It is in his discussion of such matters as capital gains, restricted stock
options, depreciation, and the dividend credit that Smith's basic philosophy
manifests itself most strongly. His proposals in these areas are by no means
untenable. It is his reasoning and his lack of diffidence in making those proposals which, in my opinion, are objectionable.
Smith states that "it is hard to imagine any single change in the tax law
which would do as much damage to economic development as the full taxation,
of capital gains ....-26 The statement may seem rather extreme, but at the
23
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same time seems to make a good deal of sense. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, I for one would be unwilling to risk the possible consequences of
disregarding it. The real question is, how far can we go in taxing capital gains?
Smith does not equivocate. He states, in typically unrestrained fashion:
The present 25 per cent maximum is probably the highest which could be
imposed without serious curtailment of investment in new ventures and
other high-risk fields. This is not subject to proof a priori, but a chance to
retain three-quarters of a profit sounds a good deal more attractive than a
27
chance to retain, say, only two-thirds of a profit.
Those who are not thoroughly persuaded by this reasoning need not be concerned. The author's proposal for a change in the rate of taxation of capital
gains is placed on a different ground-the largely unproved but possibly selfproving "freezing" hypothesis. This notion, that the tax discourages the sale
of property on which a substantial gain "has developed," 28 leads to two suggestions. The first is for a return to a tax which decreases as the holding
period increases, eventually reaching a maximum rate of 121/ per cent. But in
contrast with other adherents of the "freezing" hypothesis, Smith would
shorten, rather than lengthen, the minimum holding period. In sum, his proposal is for "an increase in the minimum holding period to one year with a
371 per cent maximum rate on holdings of one to three years, 25 per cent on
holdings of four to ten years, and 12/; per cent on holdings of over ten
years." 29 Thus it can be seen that his proposal is not of the anti-tax sort
which one usually associates with the kind of premises upon which he relies;
undoubtedly it would find widespread support. His second suggestion, by no
means as conservative, would permit a tax-free roll-over of investments with
withdrawals of gains taxed as ordinary income. He concedes, however, that
this proposal may be administratively unfeasible. I imagine that experienced
tax lawyers would have a field day if a proposal bf this sort ever became the
law; avoidance of capital-gains tax would rank with percentage depletion and
restricted stock options as leading tax-saving devices. As long as the practical
problems remain unsolved (and I doubt that they can be solved), it seems unnecessary to consider the theoretical merits of the roll-over proposal.
As for restricted stock options, Smith not surprisingly assumes that, wholly apart from tax considerations, they are uniquely useful incentive devices. 3 0
However, he is sufficiently concerned with abuses that he favors a substantial
tightening of the present rules. Basically he proposes a long holding period
27
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30 A noteworthy recent article draws on past experience to cast considerable doubt on
29 p.

this assumption. Wallace, Should We Continue to Encourage the Use of Restricted Stock
Options, 39 TAXEs 785 (1961). The author also attempts to demonstrate that the tax advantages of the use of such options may well be overrated.
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with the executive's own capital at risk. This eminently sound proposal might
well sound the death knell for the use of this form of compensation.
Also not surprising are Smith's views on the depreciation deduction. He
regards the present allowances as woefully inadequate. One of his more intriguing suggestions is that depreciation for tax purposes should not be allowed to exceed depreciation for ordinary accounting and public reporting
purposes. The basis for this proposal seems to be the somewhat startling assumption that businessmen behave irrationally. He assumes a widespread
reluctance to retire assets which have not been fully depreciated on the books.
His goal is to encourage faster replacement of capital asgets. Therefore, he
says, we should permit more rapid tax write-offs; if his proposal were
adopted, this would result in faster book write-offs and, by hypothesis, more
rapid replacement. I must confess that I am somewhat taken aback by the
hypothesis of irrational conduct. If businessmen are this irrational (which I
doubt), then I would seriously question Smith's views as to the desirability of
tax laws which encourage the use of retained earnings, by corporations, as a
source of funds for expansion.
In many parts of the chapter on depieciation it is difficult to determine just
what Smith's point is. But I found myself somewhat troubled by his statements on the significance of cash flow; on the relationship between the availability of modem equipment and the replacement of existing equipment; on
the relationship between European competition and domestic depreciation
policy; and on the relationship between the depreciation deduction and the
availability of funds for replacement. Indeed, the entire chapter on depreciation seems to me more likely to impede than advance the cause of public
enlightenment.
In spite of its shortcomings (or perhaps I should say of the differences between Smith's views and my own) I would not hesitate to recommend the
book most highly, on one condition: that is, that the inexperienced reader
should adopt an attitude of skepticism, ideally by fortifying himself with
study of The Ideologies of Taxation.
WILLIAM
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